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In this thesis, I analyze the role of participation in a Humanitarian Assistance/ 
Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operation on the mental health of Marines serving between 
2001 and 2011 by examining the hazard of being diagnosed with four mental health 
disorders during and after the mission while controlling for relevant demographic and 
service-specific variables. The four mental health illnesses examined are depression, 
post-traumatic stress disorder, substance abuse and self-inflicted injuries. The statistical 
model used in the thesis is the Cox proportional hazard model, a standard nonparametric 
method of survival analysis. I found that during the year HA/DR participation occurred, 
Marines were at less risk of being diagnosed with each of the four mental illnesses 
relative to those never deployed. In the years following participation in a HA/DR 
operation, Marines have comparable risk of being diagnosed with each of the four mental 
health illnesses relative to those that were never deployed. In contrast, Marines who 
returned from OEF/OIF deployments have elevated risks of all four mental health 
illnesses compared to those never deployed. Additional analysis showed that the effect of 
HA/DR deployments are similar across segments of Marines, but the elevated risks 
following OEF/OIF deployments are larger for male Marines relative to female Marines 
and for enlisted Marines relative to officers. 
 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A.  BACKGROUND ........................................................................................1 
B.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS .......................................................................2 
C.  ORGANIZATION .....................................................................................3 
II.  LITERATURE REVIEW .....................................................................................5 
A.  INTRODUCTION......................................................................................5 
B.  PAST RESEARCH ON RELIEF WORKERS .......................................5 
C.  PAST RESEARCH ON FIRST RESPONDERS ....................................7 
D.  EFFECTS OF MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS .......................................9 
E.  MENTAL HEALTH ................................................................................11 
1.  Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder .................................................12 
2.  Depression .....................................................................................13 
3.  Substance Abuse...........................................................................14 
4.  Self-Inflicted Injuries ...................................................................15 
F.  SUMMARY ..............................................................................................16 
III.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY ........................................................................17 
A.  DATA ........................................................................................................17 
1.  Defense Manpower Data Center .................................................17 
2.  Tricare Management Activity Data ...........................................17 
3.  Total Forces Data Warehouse.....................................................18 
4.  Humanitarian Assistance Proxy .................................................18 
5.  Frequency of HA/DR Deployments ............................................19 
B.  DEFINING THE ANALYTICAL SAMPLE.........................................20 
C.  KEY VARIABLES...................................................................................21 
1.  Outcome Variables.......................................................................21 
2.  Deployment Information .............................................................21 
3.  Demographic Variables ...............................................................23 
a.  Age and Gender .................................................................23 
b.  Race and Ethnicity ............................................................23 
c.  Marital Status ....................................................................23 
d.  Dependents ........................................................................24 
4.  Service Variables ..........................................................................24 
a.  Military Occupational Specialty .......................................24 
b.  Rank ...................................................................................25 
5.  Enlisted-Specific Service Variables ............................................25 
 viii
a.  Armed Forces Qualification Test .....................................25 
b.  Enlistment Waivers ...........................................................26 




A.  MARINE INFORMATION PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT ..................31 
B.  COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARD MODELS ....................................33 
1.  Effect of Deployments on Mental Health Outcomes .................34 
2.  Other Significant Risk Factors of Mental Health 
Outcomes ......................................................................................35 
3.  Additional Exploratory Analysis ................................................36 
a.  Gender Interaction Model ................................................37 




A.  HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE VS. OEF/OIF 
DEPLOYMENTS .....................................................................................41 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH .......................43 
APPENDIX. RESULTS ...................................................................................................45 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................49 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.  Marine deployments between 2001 and 2011 ...........................................20 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.  Percent of Marines in each deployment category: whole sample  and 
by mental health diagnoses ........................................................................27 
Table 2.  Percent of Marines in demographic categories: whole sample  and by 
mental health diagnoses .............................................................................27 
Table 3.  Percent of Marines in service categories: whole sample  and by 
mental health diagnoses .............................................................................28 
Table 4.  Demographic information for Marines prior to deployment .....................32 
Table 5.  Service information for Marines prior to deployment ...............................33 
Table 6.  Effect of deployments on mental health outcomes ....................................35 
Table 7.  Interaction model between female indicator and  four deployment 
variables .....................................................................................................37 
Table 8.  Interaction model between officer indicator and  four deployment 
variables .....................................................................................................38 
Table 9.  Effect of deployments on mental health outcomes, full results .................45 
Table 10.  Interaction model between female indicator and four deployment 
variables .....................................................................................................46 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AFQT  Armed Forces Qualification Test 
ASVAB  Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery 
CAPER Comprehensive Ambulatory/ Professional Encounter Record 
CTS Contingent Tracking System 
CY  Calendar Year 
DMDC  Defense Manpower Data Center 
DOD  Department of Defense 
DSM  Diagnostic and Statistics Manual 
EDIPI  Electronic Database Interchange Personal Identification 
HA/DR Humanitarian Assistance/ Disaster Relief 
HR Hazard Ratio 
HSM Humanitarian Service Medal 
ICD  International Classification of Diseases 
MCTFS  Marine Corps Total Forces System 
MOS Military Occupational Specialty 
OEF Operation Enduring Freedom 
OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom 
PTSD Post-traumatic Stress Disorder 
SADR Standard Ambulatory Data Record 
SIDR Standard Inpatient Data Record 
TEDI Tricare Encounter Data- Institutional 
TEDN Tricare Encounter Data- Non-institutional 
TFDW Total Forces Data Warehouse 
TMA Tricare Management Activity 
VA Veterans Affairs 
  
 xiv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
First and most importantly, I want to thank my family for their unwavering 
support throughout this process, as well as my entire career. I have been fortunate enough 
to be blessed with two strong parents who instilled in me the importance of hard work 
and resiliency through difficult times. Their unconditional love and guidance could not be 
overstated, and is something I will continue to cherish for the rest of my life.  
My sisters are the two most important people in my life. Whether they are 
pushing me to do my best at work or in school, reminding me of hysterical childhood 
antics, or simply checking in on how my day is going, they have been every bit of my 
motivation in every aspect of my life.  
My two advisors have made the thesis writing process as painless as possible. 
Between Dr. Shen pushing me to produce the best product I could, and Professor 
Summers reminding me I am a grunt and to remain calm, I was able to produce a thesis I 
am very proud of. Thank you both. 
Finally, I want to thank my Marines. They are why I am here. Semper Fidelis. 
 xvi





Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States military entered 
its longest period of continuous armed conflict since the Vietnam War. From the point 
when the United States entered Afghanistan in October 2001 and Iraq in 2003, more than 
1.6 million service members deployed to at least one of the two theaters of combat (Seal, 
2009). As the United States military fought through a new generation of warfare, often 
involving an unknown enemy, hostile local populations, improvised explosive devices 
and high rates of collateral damage, a new form of casualty became prevalent.  
Multiple, consecutive combat deployments in support of Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) have resulted in a significant 
increase in the rate of mental-health casualties throughout the military. In an effort to 
better understand, treat, and prevent these injuries, the Department of Defense (DOD) 
commissioned several studies tailored to combat veterans. These studies, as well as the 
ever-increasing public awareness surrounding appropriate medical care of veterans, have 
led to increased cognizance on mental health issues faced by service members. 
As situational awareness grew around the negative effects the Global War on 
Terrorism had on mental health of service members, so did questions regarding the 
impacts on mental health of other forms of military operations. Humanitarian Assistance/ 
Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations, for example, have been a large part of the Marine 
Corps’ mission for the last several decades. Since 1975, the DOD has participated in over 
300 named Humanitarian Assistance operations throughout the country and around the 
world (DOD, 2012). Between 2001 and 2011, the same time period both OIF and OEF 
were at their height, the Marine Corps responded to 44 separate HA/DR operations with 
over 30,000 service members participating.  
The primary mission of the U.S. military is to provide national defense and to 
protect national interests abroad. An argument has been made that a military force, 
particularly the U.S. military is, “an inappropriate provider for humanitarian aid and that 
 2
HA/DR operations negatively impact the military’s warfighting mission” (Spring, 1993). 
Also, a belief that the military is not trained or equipped—and should not be trained or 
equipped—for providing humanitarian aid exists to deter military use in this capacity. 
Further, the use of a third-party military can oftentimes escalate an already tragic and 
deadly situation into an armed conflict, as evinced during Operation Restore Hope in 
Somalia (Stockton, 1997). However, the number of HA/DR operations to which the U.S. 
military has responded is increasing, with the DOD responding to more HA/DR 
operations in 2011 than in any year since 1999 (DOD, 2012). 
Ultimately, several reasons explain why the military is used, and will continue to 
be used, to conduct HA/DR operations instead of nonmilitary agencies such as the United 
States’ USAID. As Ritchie and Mott (2003) said, “These agencies may not be structured 
to handle massive humanitarian requirements without military assistance. Few 
organizations outside of the military have the capacity to quickly move materiel, establish 
secure routes for aid delivery, develop command and control mechanisms, and provide 
direct assistance.” Although the physical architecture provided by a military when 
conducting a HA/DR operation is of undeniable value, there often exists a political 
ulterior motive in governments’ deploying relief troops. “The deployment of military 
forces to assist with a foreign emergency is a very visible show of support for a foreign 
government and its people” (Ritchie & Mott, 2003). In theory, a population given come 
form of humanitarian assistance by U.S. military units will be more likely to support a 
U.S. military presence in the future, therefore furthering U.S. national interests abroad. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Regardless of the reason or motivation behind military involvement in them, 
HA/DR operations are a type of mission that Marines will continue to execute in the 
future. As a result, there may exist a risk for long-lasting detrimental mental health 
effects related to participation in HA/DR operations. This thesis seeks to determine 
whether participation in a Humanitarian Assistance/ Disaster relief operation correlates 
with an increase in the diagnosis of mental health diagnosis rates among Marines. 
Further, because this research is being conducted following 14 years of continuous 
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combat operations, this thesis will determine whether the HA/DR participation effect, if 
any, differs when a Marine has also completed a combat deployment. Finally, the HA/DR 
participation effect will be evaluated to determine if its prevalence is different between 
ranks, genders or military occupational specialties (MOS). 
C. ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this thesis consists of four chapters to support analysis of the 
research questions. Chapter II focuses on an overview of Humanitarian Assistance/ 
Disaster Relief operations and the Marine Corps’ role in HA/DR response. A review of 
existing relevant literature on the mental-health effects military deployments, regardless 
of type, have on military members is presented along with studies of civilian relief 
workers and emergency first responders. Finally, the first chapter include a brief 
overview of the mental illnesses used in the study so to provide an understanding of how 
HA/DR participation can result in mental illness. 
Chapter III of this thesis concentrates on the data and methodology used for 
analysis. Data obtained from the Tricare Management Activity (TMA), the Defense 
Manpower Data Center (DMDC) as well as the Marine Corps’ Total Forces Data 
Warehouse (TFDW) are refined and constructed into an analytical working file that 
allows for analysis in support of answering the research questions. The analysis involves 
a combination of descriptive statistics and multivariate regression models, which are 
described in detail in this section.  
The final portion of this thesis involves the last two chapters: Results and 
Conclusions. Here, a detailed analysis of the multivariate regression results,  as well as 
the overall study’s implications, are discussed. Understanding what effect, if any, 
participation in a HA/DR operation has on a Marine’s mental-health will provide military 
leaders and mental health professionals invaluable insight to allow for proper pre and 
post deployment screening, evaluation and treatment. Ultimately, the hope is that this 
thesis provides information to military leaders so that the risk to a Marine’s mental-health 
following a HA/DR operation is as mitigated as possible. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Very few studies have been conducted that focus on the mental health of service 
members following a HA/DR operation. As a result, a collection of literature that 
concentrates on civilian relief workers and first responders will be presented. These two 
groups of workers have several commonalities with military HA/DR personnel that lead 
to a better understanding of what a Marine responding to a HA/DR operation may 
experience.  
In addition to presenting information on relief workers and first responders, this 
chapter will also examine mental health impacts of military deployments in general—
without focus on combat or humanitarian assistance operations. For service members, 
simply leaving a well evolved support structure of friends and family to travel to foreign 
lands for extended periods of time presents opportunities for mental health problems.  
B. PAST RESEARCH ON RELIEF WORKERS 
“Humanitarian relief workers are at a higher risk for developing trauma related 
mental illness due to their ongoing exposure to primary and secondary trauma” 
(Holloway & Everly, 2010). “Specifically, intensity and duration of exposure have been 
shown to play an important role in symptom development” (Norris, Friedman, Watson, 
Byrne, & Diaz, 2002). Workers are subjected to complex emergencies and disasters 
where death and destruction often runs rampant. Stress and mental fatigue surrounding 
exposure to these types of environment are amplified by separation from “normal sources 
of psychological and social support” (Connorton, Perry, Hemenway, & Miller, 2011). 
Work associated with disaster relief is unpredictable and often puts the relief worker in 
danger at times. A 2000 study of death among humanitarian aid workers found that, “of 
375 known deaths, 69% were due to violence” (Connorton et al., 2011). These traumatic 
events leave humanitarian aid workers at risk for both acute and chronic post-traumatic 
stress, depression and anxiety. 
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There exists no question that the work conducted by humanitarian assistance 
workers is stressful, exhausting and, at times, dangerous. The level of strain placed on 
relief workers is substantial, with mental health effects similar to those experienced by 
combat veterans: edginess, hypervigilance, aggression, withdrawal, sleep disturbances 
and more (Holloway & Everly, 2010). Although these effects are applicable to the many 
flavors of relief workers (non-governmental organizations, United Nations, military) 
opinions on the impacts of a HA/DR operation on military units in particular seem to 
vary. 
In the conduct of a meta-analysis performed by Connorton et al., researchers 
reached the conclusion that organized military units are less affected by the stresses and 
danger prevalent in humanitarian assistance operations. The claim includes that, because 
military units responding to a humanitarian assistance operation deploy from abroad as a 
highly cohesive workforce they are better prepared and equipped for the trials of disaster 
relief. Further, the researchers suggest that because military relief workers are armed, the 
threat of personal injury is lessened and therefore so is the potential to develop a trauma 
related illness. Finally, the suggestion that pre-deployment and post-deployment medical 
screening measures in place are an effective tool in combating trauma related mental 
illness (either PTSD, depression, anxiety disorders and substance abuse) and set the 
military apart from non-military relief workers. Although all of these claims are based on 
observations and seem to hold a high level of validity, they are not viewed as 
unanimously accurate. 
Conversely to the views just discussed that put military humanitarian workers at a 
lower risk for developing trauma related mental illness, Holloway and Everly’s (2010) 
approach to the mental impact of HA/DR operations argues the risk is just as high or 
higher than non-military relief workers. HA/DR missions pose a unique set of challenges 
to military units that do not necessarily exist in combat. For example, in combat a 
Marine’s main focus is on surviving and, as a result, the majority of a Marine’s thoughts 
are on surviving. Holloway and Everly present that, without taking away from the stress 
inherent to combat operations, the lack of concern for survivability in a HA/DR operation 
allows for more introspective and potentially harmful thoughts. In responding to a 
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HA/DR operation, Marines are usually thrust into an environment in which they know 
little about the culture, history, language, or needs of the local population. The frustration 
that surrounds an inability to understand what is truly needed in an emergency situation, 
and then not being able to provide for that need, has the ability to cause significant harm 
to a Marine’s self-confidence and self-efficacy. “Even when they are able to make small 
positive impacts on a local community (when conducting a HA/DR operation) they may 
later become disillusioned when they realize the futility of their efforts if the mission took 
place in an area lacking the proper infrastructure to continue provision of services after 
they depart” (Ritchie & Mott, 2003). Similar feelings have been felt by veterans of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom following the recent fall of key cities such as Ramadi and Mosul 
to the Islamic State (NPR Staff, 2014). 
C. PAST RESEARCH ON FIRST RESPONDERS 
Exploring past research of the impacts combat has on military service members 
provides some benefit to this thesis. The studies serve to provide a background for what 
service members may or may not be exposed to prior to a HA/DR operation, they give a 
glimpse into the culture of the military and also provide detailed summary statistics for 
comparison. However, there exists a significant difference experienced in combat and in 
a HA/DR operation. In combat, the trauma experienced is often focused on the individual 
and his survival or the survival of his closest friends. This level of threat to personal 
safety may not exist in a HA/DR operation. However, there is an exposure to death and 
destruction of an innocent population. As one Marine said, “It’s one thing to see a dead 
body in combat. It’s another thing to see dead bodies being pulled from rubble” (Talton, 
2010). 
Because of a lack of research available into the mental health effects of a 
humanitarian operation, we will turn to a substantial base of knowledge on the mental 
health impacts faced by first responders. For both of these studies, “first responders” 
refers to police, firefighters, paramedics, and search and rescue personnel. 
Arguably, 9/11 is the most well-known disaster to face this country in the last 50 
years. In a time of need, thousands of first responders flocked to the World Trade Center 
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in New York in an effort to provide assistance. These responders were all part of a police 
force, the military, or a fire department, each responder with substantial prior training and 
exposure to traumatic events. These characteristics, similar to those possessed by Marines 
responding to a HA/DR operation, add validity to the comparison between the two.  
In this study, the researchers used a combination of semi-structured interviews 
and standardized self-report measures to assess rates and severity of PTSD and other 
diagnosable mental disorders four and six years after the September 11 attacks. 
Cukor et al. (2011) state, “Studies have found high rates of PTSD, major 
depressive disorder, and substance abuse or dependence, with PTSD believed to be the 
most common mental health problem following disaster.” Further, there was a significant 
difference in diagnosis of “full PTSD” and “partial PTSD,” which were related to two 
main factors (Cukor et al., 2011).  
The first factor was the presence of depression soon after the disaster. This is 
significant because, as discussed earlier, depression can be diagnosed after two months of 
continuous symptoms or, in rare occurrences, after a single incident. The shortened 
timeframe needed for diagnosis, the continued work in law enforcement or fire rescue 
following 9/11 and the fact that Cukor et al.’s first period for interviews was four years 
after 9/11 again show the potential for comorbidity between the two disorders.  
The second factor differentiating “full PTSD” from “partial PTSD” was either the 
continuous or greater occupational exposure post disaster. This factor is especially 
pertinent to Marines as training for combat is continuous, as is the threat of deploying to 
a combat zone. Also, it is not uncommon for a unit of Marines to deploy once to a 
HA/DR operation and a second time to combat, especially between 2001 and 2011. 
A second study relevant to mental health following a humanitarian assistance or 
disaster relief operation involved the study of New Zealand police following the 
Canterbury earthquakes. The Canterbury earthquakes were a series of eight earthquakes 
and nearly 10,000 aftershocks that rocked New Zealand between September 2010 and 
January 2012, resulting in 185 deaths and nearly 8,000 injuries. Following the worst 
earthquake, in February 2011, members of the police force found themselves operating 
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outside their traditional duties of law and order. “Alongside regular duties, police 
provided security cordons, organized evacuations and search and rescue, worked in 
victim identification teams, provided missing persons/family liaison support, and 
organized media briefings” (Snell, Surgenor, Dorahy, & Hay-Smith, 2014). 
The stress caused by these collateral duties was significant and amplified by the 
level of destruction and sudden onset of earthquakes and aftershocks encountered daily. 
For Marines, an organization trained and equipped to fight in combat, similar feelings can 
be expected. In January 2010, Marines responded to the earthquake in Haiti that left over 
100,000 people dead. The responding Marines, which consisted of the infantry unit, 1st 
Battalion, 9th Marines, had been preparing for a combat deployment to Afghanistan when 
tasked with disaster relief. The rapid change of mission, gear and mindset from one a 
Marine is prepared for to one that is filled with uncertainty can have lasting impacts on 
their mental health. As a result, Marines may, “return home being less confident in their 
own abilities, more frustrated, and haunted by moral and ethical dilemmas than they may 
have expected from a non-combat mission”  (Holloway & Everly, 2010). 
This thesis will continue with original research looking into the effects 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations can have on a Marine’s mental 
health. We will compare rates of diagnosis of PTSD, depression, substance abuse and 
suicide among Marines that deployed in support of a HA/DR operation with a sample of 
Marines that had deployed to combat and a sample of Marines that have not deployed. 
D. EFFECTS OF MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS 
Although military deployments have been around since the country’s inception, 
the nature of deployments has evolved in the spectrum of mission sets since the 
conclusion of World War II. World War II saw the deployment of over 16 million 
Americans overseas for an unknown period of time to fight a conventional war. The 
enemy wore uniforms; there was an easily distinguishable front line and service members 
“were involved for the duration of the war until a wound or other medical or psychiatric 
condition required their evacuation” (McCarroll, Hoffman, Grieger, & Holloway, 2006). 
As the 20th century continued and U.S. service-members found themselves in combat 
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again in Korea and Vietnam, the nature of their deployments differed. Both conflicts 
were marred by less clearly defined missions and political end-states than World War II 
and were part of the Cold War’s broader campaign against the spread of communism. 
This campaign brought about the rise of the military’s modern continuous global 
deployment cycle and the expectation for military units to be able to respond to any task 
ranging from large-scale conventional war to non-kinetic humanitarian assistance 
operations. 
Although the conduct of a military deployment has evolved, the stressors inherent 
to deploying have remained practically unchanged since first identified during World 
War II. Newby et al. (2005) outlined what they consider the primary stressors as, 
uncertainty, separation, isolation, danger, and fatigue. Each of these stressors can be 
experienced not only in combat but in the conduct of a humanitarian assistance operation 
as well. When describing the environment faced by HA/DR responders, Holloway and 
Everly (2010) state they, “must always face the sheer difficulty of operating in 
environments that are often austere, pose significant language and cultural barriers, may 
be vulnerable to security threats and lack proper equipment and tools.”  
Current military deployment cycles focus around five separate phases of 
deployment: Pre-deployment, Deployment, Re-deployment, Sustainment and Post 
Deployment (Pincus, House, Christenson, & Adler, 2001). Each stage of deployment 
differs slightly based on the mission. However, emotional and mental impacts on service 
members are consistent. For example, the pre-deployment stage of a deployment begins 
when a service member first learns they will be deploying. This stage can last from weeks 
to over a year and involves the service member, “balancing a vastly increased workload 
as well as family preparations, responsibilities, and reactions” (Sheppard & Malatras, 
2010).  
A major stressor for service members during the pre-deployment phase comes in 
the form of a constantly changing and evolving mission. Particularly in the last 14 years 
of combat, it was not uncommon for a unit to be notified for a non-combat deployment 
only to have its mission change partially through pre-deployment training. The 
combination of an unknown mission with an unknown deployment duration and 
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departure date can have, “important implications for the morale and stress level 
experienced by personnel and their families” (McCarroll, Hoffman, Grieger, & 
Holloway, 2006). These stressors, though significant, only increase as the service 
member continues their training and ultimately deploys oversees. 
Once deployed, service members are faced with an emotional and physical 
distance to their normal support structure that makes dealing with stress even more 
difficult. This separation from friends and family coupled with uncertain deployment 
length, high work tempo, threat of death or injury and austere living conditions present 
some of the most significant stressors a service member will ever face (Hosek, 
Kavanaugh, & Miller, 2006). These stressors are not exclusive to combat deployments 
and can be found in HA/DR operations as well. According to Holloway and Everly 
(2010), these stressors as well as the increasing use of the military in HA/DR operations 
is, “creating an emerging class of humanitarian assistance veterans at a high risk of 
mental health complications and who have very unique and special needs.” 
E. MENTAL HEALTH 
Due to the inherant risks associated with military service, as well as the seperation 
and anxiety associated with deployments, members of the armed forces are at a higher 
risk for developing mental health problems than those not in uniform (Moore & Barnett, 
2013). A service member suffering from a mental disorder can tear at the fabric that is 
unit effectiveness and readiness, putting more than just their health at risk. Mental health 
is not only a common struggle for military members, it can also be a debilitating one; a 
service member’s mental health can extend beyond a personal level to affect overall unit 
readiness and mission capability (Moore & Barnett, 2013).  
This thesis will look at the rates of some of the most common and prevalant 
mental health disorders found in the military and compare rates of diagnosis among 
HA/DR responders and those who have not participated in a HA/DR operation. 
Specifically, this thesis will look at rates of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), 
depression, substance abuse and suicide. A brief description, diagnostic criteria and 
relevance to service members will be discussed for each disorder. 
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1. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
An emotional reaction after being exposed to tragedy, trauma or disaster has been 
prevalent in the world of psychology for hundreds of years. Following the end of the 
Civil War, soldiers returning home as psychological casualties were diagnosed with 
“nostalgia” which was considered to be a mild form of “insanity caused by 
disappointment and longing for home” (Lopez-Ibor, Christadoulou, Maj, Sartorius, & 
Okasha, 2005). As time passed throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, and war between 
nations occurred regularly, the knowledge base surrounding traumatic mental illness 
grew. Although the term used to describe the mental illness varied over time—shell 
shock during World War I or battle fatigue during World War II—each conflict brought 
with it a population of distraught, fearful and mentally unstable veterans.  
By the end of the Vietnam War, thousands of veterans were being treated at local 
Veterans Affairs (VA) hospitals as if a diagnosis for “traumatic war neurosis” was 
available. This common form of treatment occurred nationwide even though no formal 
diagnosis for a mental illness related to traumatic stress existed (Bloom, 2000). Following 
intensive research into trauma induced mental disorders, which extended beyond combat 
into rape, genocide, burn victims and first responders, post-traumatic stress disorder was 
formalized as a mental health diagnosis and added to the Diagnostics and Statistics 
Manual of Mental Disorders in 1978 (Bloom, 2000). 
A consideration worth noting for post-traumatic stress disorder specifically 
relevant to military service members is defining exposure to a traumatic event. Exposure 
can occur in several ways: directly experiencing the trauma, witnessing, in person, the 
events as they occurred to others or learning that the trauma has occurred to a close friend 
of family member (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). An additional method of 
exposure to trauma that is especially significant to humanitarian assistance workers is 
“Experiencing repeated or extreme exposure to aversive details of the traumatic event(s)” 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Examples used to support diagnosis with this 
trauma exposure include, “first responders collecting human remains,” an unwelcomed 
task often performed by relief workers during HA/DR operations. This form of 
“secondary traumatic stress” mirrors strains placed on therapists and social workers 
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constantly exposed to, “trauma survivors’ terrifying, horrifying and shocking images; 
strong chaotic affect; and intrusive traumatic memories” (Jenkins & Baird, 2002). 
Secondary traumatic stress and its impact on mental health diagnosis has been studied in 
depth and validated as a powerful trigger for traumatic related mental illness.  
A final note on PTSD is that there exists a large population of individuals exposed 
to trauma who never develop symptoms relating to PTSD. When studying the rate of 
PTSD among first responders to the September 11 terror attacks on the World Trade 
Center in New York, Cukor et al. (2011) found that there existed a high percentage of 
PTSD-free first responders. “The high percentage of workers in this PTSD-free group 
serves as a reminder of the general resilience of individuals who were called upon to 
work at a disaster site that do not develop PTSD, and that indeed, PTSD is a disorder that 
occurs primarily in a subset of individuals who have psychiatric vulnerability combined 
with more intense exposure” (Cukor et al., 2011). 
2. Depression 
Depression is one of the most common mental health diagnoses, with over 
350 million people diagnosed and suffering from depression worldwide (World Health 
Organization, 2012). It is the leading cause of disability globally and effects men, women 
and children. Causes of depression can vary from a loss of job, ending of a relationship or 
exposure to a traumatic event. Typically, depression is not life threatening; however, if 
left untreated the illness could progress and result in suicide.  
As an illness, depression presents itself in different ways with the severity and 
duration varying from person to person. The variability in causes, signs, symptoms and 
severity has led to several disorders categorized under the header of “depressive 
disorders.” The most common, particularly related to service members returning from 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations include major depressive disorder 
and persistent depressive disorder, also known as dysthymia (Holloway & Everly, 2010). 
Major depressive disorder can also be diagnosed as a major depressive episode if 
based on a single incident. “Careful consideration is given to the delineation of normal 
sadness and grief from a major depressive episode. Bereavement may induce great 
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suffering, but it does not typically induce an episode of major depressive disorder” 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Symptoms required for diagnosis of persistent 
depressive disorder are very similar to those of major depressive disorder with decreased 
severity but an increased amount of time required for diagnosis (two years.) 
One of the biggest concerns with individuals suffering from depression is the 
threat of comorbidity, or the simultaneous presence of another chronic disease. Research 
has suggested that those diagnosed with depression are at a higher risk for other 
disorders, including post-traumatic stress disorder, a variety of adjustment disorders, 
anxiety disorders and substance abuse (Riddle, Sanders, Jones, & Webb, 2008). For 
example, a study conducted by Chan et al. found that, “Among veterans with PTSD, rates 
of comorbid major depression range from 29% to 68%. Among veterans with clinical 
depression, rates of comorbid PTSD are 36% – 51%” (Chan, Cheadle, Reiber, Unutzer, & 
Chaney, 2009).  
3. Substance Abuse 
Substance abuse is a diagnosable mental disorder which features the excessive use 
of a psychoactive substance “resulting in a combination of cognitive, behavioral and 
physiological symptoms” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Use of the symptom 
causing substance continues despite significant substance related problems including, 
“impaired control, social impairment and risk-taking as well as secondary health 
concerns” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  
Substance abuse, regardless of type, has historically been a common problem for 
military members (Jones & Fear, 2011). A study conducted by Shen et al. looked at a 
series of population-based studies of the U.S. Military between 2001 and 2006 and found 
that the “incidence of a newly diagnosed substance abuse disorder ranged from 6% to 
nearly 9%, overall.” When looking at the Marine Corps in particular, this number nearly 
doubles from 5% to 9.3% when the sample is reduced to only Marines who have 
deployed in support of OIF or OEF (Shen, Arkes, & Williams, 2012). This is significant 
because the data used for this thesis looks at Marines serving between 2001 and 2011, 
when the percentage of active duty combat veterans was at its highest. 
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Although these numbers are significant, they may not accurately reflect the true 
level of substance abuse within the military. “It is likely that the base rates of heavy 
alcohol use, particularly among young service members are higher than recorded 
substance abuse diagnoses” (Mooney et al., 2014). Further, Ramchand et al. (2010) found 
that, among previously deployed service members, “deployment-related experiences 
(e.g., combat-related traumas) and psychological distress (e.g., symptoms associated with 
posttraumatic stress disorder) were associated with frequency of drinking behaviors.” 
As with depression, there exists a high level of comorbidity between a diagnosed 
substance abuse and other mental disorders, such as PTSD. “Both increases in self-
reported posttraumatic distress and depressive symptomatology were positively 
associated with drinking and binge drinking more frequently” (Ramchand et al., 2010).  
4. Self-Inflicted Injuries 
Service members are subjected to higher levels of stress than a comparison 
sample of the civilian population. Deployments, life and death decisions, geographical 
distance from friends and family and a high expectation of performance all contribute a 
level of stress to a service member unique to the military (Moore & Barnett, 2013). 
Recently, the statistic that 22 veterans a day commit suicide has become a rallying cry 
behind the suicide problem faced by men and women in uniform. Though astounding, 
this number does not represent the current rate among service members and instead 
represents over 22 million veterans, the majority of whom left active duty decades ago 
(Zarembo, 2015). 
Making a direct comparison to self-inflicted injury rates in the military and self-
inflicted rates among the general population presents some unique challenges. For 
example, the military population consists of a younger average age, is “disproportionately 
male and has a different composition of race and ethnicity than the civilian population” 
(Ramchand, Acosta, Burns, Jaycox, & Pernin, 2011). Ramchand et al. (2011) constructed 
an adjusted national population that mirrored the make-up and demographics of the 
current military population so to accurately compare self-inflicted injury rates. Using the 
simulated population for comparison, they found that self-inflicted injury rates in the 
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simulated comparable population were higher than those in the military. However, 
military rates were rising while those in the comparable population were remaining 
constant. 
Regardless of the specific rates of suicide, or self-inflicted injuries, within the 
military, the traumatic work Marines are exposed to when conducting HA/DR operations 
cannot be dismissed. Further, we have already seen that there exists an increased risk of 
PTSD, depression and substance abuse diagnosis to relief workers—all of which carry a 
high degree of comorbidity. Because of this, the threat of a self-inflicted injury as a result 
of participating in a HA/DR operation must be reviewed and cannot be understated. 
F. SUMMARY 
Although a base of research does not yet exist into the impacts of Humanitarian 
Assistance operations on service members, there are similarities with service members 
effected by combat deployments and first responders effected by natural or man-made 
disasters. This chapter identified these similarities and how they are related to HA/DR 
operation participants. Further, a detailed look at the mental health diagnoses most 
prevalent to these disasters were analyzed. The next chapter will present and describe in 
detail the data used for this thesis as well as the model constructed to analyze said data.  
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
A. DATA 
Data for this thesis came from three different military sources: Defense 
Manpower Data Center (DMDC), Tricare, and the Marine Corps Total Forces Data 
Warehouse (TFDW). The data sources were merged via a scrambled study ID, and 
provide demographic information, mental health diagnoses and deployment 
information—including HA/DR participation—for the entire Marine Corps between 2001 
and 2011. 
1. Defense Manpower Data Center   
The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) is a DOD wide data center that 
serves under the Office of the Secretary of Defense. DMDC responsible for collecting 
and maintaining an archive of manpower, training, financial and other databases for the 
Department of Defense. The DMDC database provides two critical data—the master 
personnel data provide demographic and service characteristics, such as age, rank, marital 
status and military occupational specialty (MOS). The Contingent Tracking System 
(CTS) provide limited deployment information for the Marines. In particular, the CTS 
provides deployment information for those that were deployed under Operation Iraqi 
Freedom and Operation Enduring freedom (OEF/OIF)). Altogether the data contains 
2,687,340 person-year observations on all Marine enlisted personnel and officers who 
ever served anytime between the first quarter of calendar year (CY) 2001 through the 
fourth quarter of CY 2011, representing 619,850 unique Marines.  
2. Tricare Management Activity Data 
TRICARE is the health care system of the Department of Defense provided to 
active, reserve, retired and military-dependent members of the Armed Forces. Data 
provided from Tricare Management Activity (TMA) includes all inpatient and outpatient 
mental health disorder diagnosis that were recorded in both military and civilian health 
care facilities. For the purposes of this research, mental health diagnosis information 
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analyzed included post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, substance abuse and self-
inflicted injuries, all of which were identified and recorded through Tricare using their 
appropriate World Health Organization International Classification of Diseases (ICD-9) 
codes (Medicode, 1996).  
The data provided by TMA comes from several different Tricare internal 
databases that fully capture every aspect of a Marine’s inpatient and outpatient treatment 
history. Two databases, the Standard Inpatient Data Record (SIDR) and the Tricare 
Encounter Data-Institutional (TEDI) provide information on Marines inpatient treatment, 
either at a military treatment facility, such as a base hospital or military physician, or a 
non-military treatment facility such as a local hospital emergency room. Two other 
databases, the Standard Ambulatory Data Record (SADR)/Comprehensive 
Ambulatory/Professional Encounter Record (CAPER), and Tricare Encounter Data—
Non-Institutional (TEDN) are used in a similar fashion as SIDR and TEDI, but capture 
outpatient treatment history. When merged, these databases provide a complete snapshot 
of any individual Marine’s medical history, to include mental health.  
3. Total Forces Data Warehouse 
The Marine Corps’ Total Forces Data Warehouse (TFDW) is a database 
containing information on numerous data fields for all uniformed Marine Corps 
personnel. TFDW provides leaders with historical financial, demographic and service 
information on all Marines so to better aid decision making and ensure the well-being of 
Marines. TFDW collects data from the Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS), the 
central collection point for all data within the operating forces of the Marine Corps. 
Whereas MCTFS is a living database that provides users with a snapshot of the current 
state of their unit or the Corps as a whole, TFDW is used primarily for historical data. As 
such, TFDW data is populated by MCTFS on the last day of each month and holds 
records going back nearly 30 years.  
4. Humanitarian Assistance Proxy  
As mentioned earlier, CTS only captures deployment under OEF/OIF. Though 
helpful, this information does not include whether or not a Marine participated in a 
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humanitarian assistance operation. To collect this information, the Humanitarian Service 
Medal (HSM) was used as a proxy for HA/DR participation.  
According to the Department of the Navy’s Awards Manual, the HSM is an 
individual award given to members of the armed services that, “distinguish themselves by 
meritorious, direct, or non-routine participation in a significant military act or operation 
of a humanitarian nature.” Award and service information within TFDW allowed for a 
data file to be populated that contained the EDIPI of all Marines that were awarded the 
HSM for actions that took place between 2001 and 2011. The data from TFDW includes 
the exact date the action which warranted the HSM occurred, which when cross 
referenced to the DOD’s list of authorized humanitarian operations allows the exact 
operation to be identified. This file was later merged with data from DMDC and TMA to 
create the final analytical sample. 
5. Frequency of HA/DR Deployments 
Due to the unpredictable nature of natural disasters requiring HA/DR aid, the 
frequency of Marines deployed in support of these operations has been relatively sporadic 
throughout the observation period. Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution of Marines 
deployed throughout the observation period, both in support of HA/DR operations as well 
as in support of OIF/OEF. Between 2001 and 2011, the Marine Corps averaged 3,333 
Marines deployed in support of HA/DR operations per year, with an average of 57,126 
deployed to OIF/OEF.  
Two years observed have noteworthy deviations in the number of Marines 
conducting HA/DR operations; 2005 and 2010. In 2005, the Marine Corps as well as the 
DOD deployed in support of some of the most devastating natural disasters in recent 
history. Within one year, nearly 8,000 Marines deployed in support of relief efforts for 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita off the Southern Coast of the United States as well as a six 
month relief operation in Pakistan following a devastating earthquake starting in October 
2005. Similarly, in 2010, 7,000 Marines deployed in support of Operation Unified 
Response following the Haitian Earthquake, flooding in Pakistan after weeks of heavy 
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monsoon rains and disaster relief in the Philippines following Super Typhoon Juan. Each 
of these events left thousands dead and caused billions of dollars in damage. 
The depiction of Marines deployed to OIF/OEF shown in Figure 1 also has some 
noteworthy milestones. First, in 2001, before the start of the Global War on Terror, nearly 
as many Marines deployed to HA/DR operations as combat operations. This is significant 
because it shows the consistency of humanitarian assistance operations both during 
combat operations as well as alone. Next, the rapid spike in Marines deployed from 
13,764 in 2002 to 75,652 in 2003 was caused by the invasion of Iraq in March of 2003. 
During this operation, an entire division of Marines along with thousands of joint forces 
began an eight-year campaign that sent several million service members overseas. 
Finally, the steady decline in deployed Marines in support of OIF/OEF starting in 2008 
was a result of the end of the Iraq War, with the final combat troops returning to the 
United States in 2011.   
Figure 1.  Marine deployments between 2001 and 2011 
 
Adapted from: Analytical sample including data from DMDC, TMA and TFDW. 
B. DEFINING THE ANALYTICAL SAMPLE 
 The data provided from DMDC, TMA and TFDW were merged to form one 
master working dataset. From this file, two separate analytical samples were generated, 
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one for enlisted personnel and one for officers (including both commissioned officers and 
warrant officers). Both samples contained identical outcome variables and demographic 
variables. They differ only in how the rank information is defined, and two additional 
service specific variables for the enlisted sample. In particular, the Armed Forces 
Qualification Test (AFQT) score and enlistment waiver information are exclusive only to 
enlisted Marines and were, for that reason, omitted from the officer sample. Each variable 
will be explained in depth in the following section of this thesis. 
C. KEY VARIABLES 
The models used for this thesis include a collection of different variables to 
measure the effect of HA/DR participation on mental health diagnosis rates. Outcome 
variables, deployment information, demographic variables and service variables were all 
included to create a model that captures as accurate an effect as possible. 
1. Outcome Variables  
This research will analyze four separate outcomes, whether a Marine was 
diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, substance abuse or a suicidal 
attempt. Each variable is defined through the DMDC and Tricare data provided and is 
indicated as binary, with 1 representing a positive diagnosis for each of the respective 
mental diseases and zero representing no diagnosis. Whereas three of the four outcome 
variables can be intuitively defined off of DSM-IV criteria or ICD-9 codes—post-
traumatic stress disorder, depression and substance abuse—the final variable, self-
inflicted injuries, requires some more clarification.  
Like the other three outcome variables, self-inflicted injuries was classified 
through corresponding ICD-9 codes, however, there is no distinction between a suicide 
attempt and a completed suicide. Therefore, for the purposes of this research, the suicide 
attempt variable includes both attempts and completions. 
2. Deployment Information 
For this research, two sets of deployment variables were used to accurately 
capture a Marine’s deployment information during the observed period. One set captures 
 22
deployment related to OEF/OIF and another set captures HA deployment. First, a binary 
variable was created that captured whether or not a Marine was deployed to OEF/OIF 
during each CY. This variable took on the value of 1 if the Marine was deployed for any 
amount of time during the corresponding CY and 0 if they were not. This variable 
included deployments not only in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Iraq and 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan but to a classified and non-specified 
locations as well. 
In order to capture the effects of an OIF/OEF deployment after a Marine has 
returned, a second variable was created to represent the time following deployment. In 
this case, the variable took on the value of 1 if a Marine had deployed in a prior year and 
0 if they had not. This variable is mutually exclusive with the OIF/OEF deploy variable 
mentioned above, that is, only one of the two variables can hold a value of 1 for a given 
CY. This variable remains zero if a Marine never deploys in support of OIF/OEF during 
the observation period and will remain 1 the year following a deployment until the 
Marine either deploys again or leaves the sample. 
A unique variable developed for this research determines if a Marine had 
participated in a Humanitarian Assistance/ Disaster Relief operation. As mentioned 
earlier, the awarding of a Humanitarian Service Medal (HSM) serves as a proxy for this 
variable. If a Marine was awarded a HSM, and therefore participated in a HA/DR 
operation between 2001 and 2011, the variable will take on the value of 1. Because the 
data covers all Marines over a 10-year period, it is possible a Marine received multiple 
HSMs and will therefore have the appropriate data entry for each year. 
The final deployment variable generated represents a Marine who had previously 
participated in a HA/DR operation. Similarly to the post deployment variable, the post 
HA/DR variable takes on the value of 1 if a Marine took part in a HA/DR operation in a 
previous year, and 0 otherwise. This variable is mutually exclusive with the HA/DR 
variable within the same CY, but not the OIF/OEF deployment or OIF/OEF post 
deployment variables as it is possible for a Marine to conduct a HA/DR operation while 
deployed in support of the Global War on Terrorism. 
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3. Demographic Variables 
In order to correctly capture the effect humanitarian assistance participation has 
on the rate of mental health diagnosis, several descriptive demographic variables were 
included in the model as regressors. Although no prior research has been done analyzing 
impacts of a humanitarian assistance mission, prior research on combat exposure has 
shown that specific demographic variables have a role in diagnosis, prompting several to 
be included. 
a. Age and Gender 
A variable for gender was included with a female indicator that takes on the value 
of 1 if a Marine is a female and 0 otherwise. The analytical sample contained a small 
sample of Marines who, for one reason or another, did not identify a gender. This sample 
consisted of 683 observations, or 0.03% of the analytical sample and were coded to be 
included with the majority gender. An age variable was included and identifies the age of 
a Marine on the last day of the CY. For ease of coefficient interpretation, further age 
categories were developed from the original age variable that classified Marines in one of 
six ranges (<22, 22–24, 25–29, 30–34, 35–39, >40). The age category of <22 comprised 
32.15% of the sample and was used as the reference. 
b. Race and Ethnicity 
Along with gender and age, race and ethnicity were also included as a single 
demographic variable. A Marine’s race and ethnicity was accounted for using a series of 
mutually exclusive binary variables that each took on the value of 1 if the Marine 
identified as a particular race and 0 if otherwise. Being mutually exclusive, each Marine 
will only appear in one category. Race indicators included were white, black, Hispanic, 
Asian, other minority (which included Native American or Asian Pacific Islander) or 
unknown race. For the model, white served as the reference group.  
c. Marital Status 
Family information was captured in several ways so to fully account for any 
difference in mental health diagnosis rates. First, variables were included to identify a 
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Marine’s marital status. These indicator variables, married, single and divorced/separated 
were included as mutually exclusive binary variables that were evaluated on the last day 
of the CY. Because the data spanned 10 years, it was possible for a Marine to have been 
divorced in year 1 and re-married in year 10, therefore an additional variable was added 
to show if a Marine was previously divorced/separated/widowed. This variable took on a 
value of 1 if a Marine previously identified as being divorced/separated/widowed in a 
previous year and was not mutually exclusive with the original marital status variable of 
married. For this study, single served as the reference group. 
d. Dependents 
In addition to marital status, variables were included to indicate the number of 
dependents a Marine had. This variable characterized a Marine in one of four different 
groups based on the number of dependents they had on the last day of the CY. These 
categories, 0, 1, 2 and 3 or more were mutually exclusive within a CY but were allowed 
to increase or decrease over time. For this study, 0 dependents comprised 55.75% of the 
sample and was used as the reference group. 
4. Service Variables 
Service specific variables were included in the model to supplement the 
demographic variables previously mentioned. These variables include deployment 
information, military occupational specialty, rank and, for enlisted Marines only, armed 
forces qualification test score and enlistment waivers. Each service variable will now be 
discussed in detail. 
a. Military Occupational Specialty 
A Marine’s military occupational specialty (MOS), is a four digit code that 
identifies a Marine’s job within the service. While there are several hundred different 
specialties, all fall within one of the three following categories: combat arms, combat 
service support and aviation. Combat arms Marines are members of the infantry, artillery 
and armor communities. These Marines are traditionally exposed to more combat and, 
until recently, have been an exclusively all male service. Combat arms Marines account 
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for 28% of the analytical sample. Combat service support is a classification given to 
supporting specialties, such as logisticians, communications, engineers and military 
police. Combat service support Marines account for 45% of the analytical sample. The 
final MOS specific variable includes all Marines with aviation specialties, to include 
pilots, maintenance workers and aircraft crew. The aviation community accounts for 19% 
of the analytical sample. Combat service support was used as the reference for this 
research. 
b. Rank 
Rank was captured in this research in two different ways. First, differentiating the 
enlisted and officer populations within the Marine Corps with different analytical 
samples allowed for different service variables to be included and provide a better 
analysis. Second, within the two separate analytical samples, Marines were further 
categorized into groups based on their pay grade on the last day of the CY. Enlisted 
Marines were separated into five separate variables, E-1/E-2, E-3, E-4, E-5 and E-6 and 
above. The officer sample was separated into six separate variables, O-1/O-2, O-3, O-4, 
O-5, O-6 and above, and Warrant Officer. The warrant officer population was not further 
divided into individual ranks because the warrant officer presence within the data is so 
small, only .95%. Lance Corporals (E-3) make up 23.07% of the entire Marine sample 
and will therefore be used as the reference for the enlisted models. Similarly, Captains 
(O-3) make up the largest percentage of the officer sample and, as such, will be used as 
the reference. 
5. Enlisted-Specific Service Variables 
a. Armed Forces Qualification Test 
The Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) is a subset of the Armed Services 
Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), the standardized test required for military 
enlistment regardless of service. AFQT score serves as a proxy for individual ability in 
this study and is only present in the enlisted sample. AFQT scores are categorized in five 
categories based on the service member’s overall score. The higher the score and 
category the more intelligent and trainable the Marine is considered to be. Each AFQT 
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category variable is binary with the variable taking on the value of 1 if the Marine’s 
AFQT score falls within the respective category and 0 otherwise. All AFQT categories 
are mutually exclusive and do not change over time as the ASVAB is taken only on 
enlistment. The AFQT categories with corresponding scores are Category 1 (93–99), 
Category II (65–92), Category IIIA (50–64), Category IIIB (31–49) and Category IV/V 
(1–30). Category II comprised 33.02% of the sample and was used as the reference for 
the enlisted models. 
b. Enlistment Waivers 
The final variable included exclusively in the enlisted model involves a collection 
of binary variables that capture the presence and severity of waivers required for 
enlistment. These binary variables include waivers for a minor offense, major/ felony 
offense, drug offense, other or none. Nested within the minor offense category includes 
minor criminal offense waivers and traffic violations while the major offense category 
includes felonies. Other waivers include non-criminal waivers including age, medical, 
education and mental health waivers. This category is included solely in the enlisted 
sample not because officers do not require waivers, but because the frequency of officer 
waivers issued is negligible. Each binary variable takes on the value of 1 if the Marine 
required the respective waiver when they enlisted and 0 otherwise. These variables are 
not mutually exclusive however it is unlikely more than one category of waiver would be 
issued for enlistment. 68.31% of the sample required no waiver, and will therefore be 
used as the reference. 
D. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Tables 1–3 provide descriptive statistics for the analytical sample used in this 
research. Five separate columns of means are provided as a snapshot of the Marines 
observed in each model. The first column of each table, labeled “Whole Sample” 
provides descriptive statistics of the 2,686,878 observations used in the model. The 
majority of observations were male (93.73%), white (70.49%) and enlisted (90.44%). 
MOS distribution has the majority of Marines serving within a combat service support 
field (45.48%), 28.35% in a combat arms MOS and 18.96% in an aviation specialty. Of 
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the 2,686,878 observations, 23.39% participated in an OIF/OEF deployment while only 
1.35%, or roughly 36,000 Marines, participated in a HA/DR operation. 
The following four columns of each table describe the sample of Marines 
diagnosed with the respective mental health condition. The sample size for those varied 
as follows: Depression: 29,573 observations, PTSD: 44,588 observations, Substance 
Abuse: 18,275 and self-inflicted injuries: 11,849 observations. 
Table 1.   Percent of Marines in each deployment category: whole sample  
and by mental health diagnoses 
 
Table 2.   Percent of Marines in demographic categories: whole sample  









During Year of HA/DR Participation 1.32% 0.57% 0.54% 0.79% 0.52%
Post HA/DR Participation 3.41% 3.11% 5.66% 3.75% 1.76%
Deployed (OIF/OEF) 24.06% 14.76% 32.26% 16.11% 11.02%
Post Deployed (OIF/OEF) 17.80% 29.29% 47.40% 32.96% 16.14%
2,597,440 11,200 17,461 7,757 2,767
Deployment Information
Sample size (n)
Marines with Mental Health Diagnosis





White 71.07% 73.78% 73.45% 75.93% 75.00%
Black 11.48% 10.59% 9.47% 8.35% 9.83%
Hispanic 8.61% 8.01% 9.47% 8.21% 8.45%
Asian 2.87% 2.38% 2.19% 2.22% 2.65%
Other Race 5.97% 5.24% 5.42% 5.29% 4.07%
Male 93.86% 83.46% 91.29% 93.31% 84.90%
Female 6.12% 16.54% 8.71% 6.69% 15.10%
Age Category
<22 32.30% 29.92% 19.76% 27.15% 51.38%
22-24 26.24% 28.96% 35.81% 37.76% 26.31%
25-29 19.22% 21.82% 24.67% 22.81% 11.92%
30-34 8.98% 8.46% 9.07% 6.21% 2.62%
35-39 6.21% 5.17% 5.69% 3.18% 1.12%
>40 7.06% 5.68% 5.01% 2.89% 6.65%
Married 42.26% 49.40% 55.07% 40.62% 30.46%
Post Divorce 5.01% 7.36% 7.99% 6.14% 4.04%
Single 52.73% 43.24% 36.95% 53.24% 65.51%
Number of Dependents
0 55.91% 48.55% 41.61% 57.75% 70.44%
1 16.51% 20.66% 22.91% 18.55% 15.58%
2 11.25% 14.00% 15.76% 11.72% 7.44%
3+ 16.33% 16.79% 19.72% 11.98% 6.54%
2,597,440        11,200         17,461     7,757         2,767         Sample size (n)
Marines with Mental Health Diagnosis
Demographic Information
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Table 3.   Percent of Marines in service categories: whole sample  




Understanding that each Marine in the dataset is present for a different amount of 
time, and has different demographic and service experiences, this thesis analyzes the 
relationship between deployment and mental health diagnoses using a survival analysis 
technique. Specifically, knowing the exact year a Marine was exposed to a Humanitarian 
Assistance/ Disaster Relief operation as well as the exact year a Marine was diagnosed 
with one of the mental health disorders examined allows the use of the standard Cox 
proportional hazard model (Cox, 1972; StataCorp LP, 2009). This model will estimate 
the relationship between mental health diagnosis of either depression, PTSD, substance 





Combat Arms MOS 28.75% 26.64% 45.22% 34.90% 28.55%
Combat Service Support MOS 46.11% 49.94% 43.45% 45.78% 40.62%
Aviation MOS 19.18% 16.77% 8.13% 15.34% 12.93%
Missing MOS 4.56% 4.38% 1.97% 3.22% 12.48%
Other MOS 2.27% 3.28% 1.66% 1.82% 6.84%
Enlisted (Total) 90.41% 96.03% 96.78% 97.98% 99.07%
E-1/E-2 19.19% 14.44% 6.84% 16.97% 37.86%
E-3 23.11% 31.48% 26.53% 37.09% 36.14%
E-4 19.08% 20.36% 26.87% 21.77% 14.39%
E-5 15.05% 17.09% 22.32% 14.41% 7.55%
E-6 & Above 13.99% 12.66% 14.21% 7.73% 3.14%
Officer (Total) 8.79% 3.37% 2.50% 1.80% 0.67%
O-1/O-2 2.44% 0.70% 0.37% 0.57% 0.30%
O-3 2.67% 1.25% 1.01% 0.52% 0.04%
O-4 1.89% 0.74% 0.64% 0.45% 0.26%
O-5 1.28% 0.48% 0.34% 0.22% 0.07%
O-6 & Above 0.51% 0.20% 0.14% 0.05% 0.00%
Warrant Officer 0.95% 0.63% 0.81% 0.21% 0.19%
AFQT Category
I 4.44% 3.85% 2.49% 3.47% 4.00%
II 33.02% 33.13% 27.87% 33.31% 36.77%
IIIA 23.33% 25.38% 26.26% 26.90% 26.83%
IIIB 25.97% 30.00% 36.44% 31.91% 30.12%
IV/V 13.24% 7.64% 6.95% 4.41% 2.28%
Waiver- None 68.30% 73.41% 73.48% 75.97% 80.79%
Waiver- Minor 1.42% 1.24% 1.47% 1.07% 0.64%
Waiver- Major/Felony 2.46% 2.49% 2.83% 3.44% 1.76%
Waiver- Drug 3.64% 3.08% 3.87% 4.54% 4.30%
Waiver- Other 11.21% 12.67% 12.49% 11.68% 10.84%
2,597,440 11,200 17,461 7,757 2,767Sample size (n)
Marines with Mental Health Diagnosis
Service Information
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abuse or self-inflicted injuries and the risk factor of HA/DR participation while 
controlling for other demographic and service variables. 
The data for this research observes all Marines until December of 2011, therefore 
it is a collection of panel data with yearly observations between 2001 and 2011. A Marine 
enters the model, or risk window, either when they enlist or are commissioned or at the 
start of the data, in this case January 1, 2001 (denoted as ݐ଴). Each year following their 
first observation will be denoted as ݐଵ, ݐଶ, ݐଷ, and so on. A Marine leaves the risk window 
when they are diagnosed with a mental health disorder. All other Marines are censored 
either in 2011 or when their observations stop, either because the Marine left service or 
has died.  
In the model, the hazard rate that Marine ݅ was diagnosed with mental disorder ݆ 
given that the Marine was not diagnosed prior to a given year is described by the 
following hazard function, ߣ௜ሺݐሻ:  
 
ܲݎ݋ܾሺܯܽݎ݅݊݁	݅	ݓܽݏ	݀݅ܽ݃݊݋ݏ݁݀	ݓ݅ݐ݄	݉݁݊ݐ݈ܽ	݀݅ݏ݋ݎ݀݁ݎ	݆	ܾݕ	ݕ݁ܽݎ	ݐ| 
ܯܽݎ݅݊݁	݅	ݓܽݏ	݊݋ݐ	݀݅ܽ݃݊݋ݏ݁݀	ܾݕ	ݐ െ 1ሻ ൌ exp	ሺߚଵܦܫ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ′ଶ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߚ′ଷ ௜ܵ௧ିଵሻߣ଴ሺݐሻ 
 
where ߣ଴ሺݐሻ is the baseline hazard rate for a mental health diagnosis for 0–12 months 
before year ݐ; ܦܫ௜௧ିଵ is a binary deployment indicator to capture whether Marine i was 
deployed  during year ݐ െ 1;  ௜ܺ௧ is a collection of demographic variables for Marine ݅ as 
of year ݐ െ 1 and ௜ܵ௧ is a collection of service variables for Marine ݅ as of year ݐ െ 1. 
Ultimately, the model looks to determine whether participation in a Huminatarian 
Assistance/ Disaster Relief operation in the year before ݐ െ 1, or in any year before ݐ െ 1 
using the post HA/DR variable, affects the probability of mental health diagnosis in the 
ሺݐ െ 1, ݐሻ period, given a diagnosis did not occur up to ݐ െ 1. Figure 2 provides a 








In total, there were four models used to measure the impact of HA/DR operations 
on each of the four mental health diagnoses.  
F. SUMMARY 
Using data collected from a variety of Department of Defense sources, I 
implement survival analysis using the Cox proportional hazard model to analyze the 
relationship between deployment and mental health outcomes. The model will determine 
whether or not participation in a HA/DR operation has any impact on the rates of 
diagnosis of four major mental disorders as well as see if any significant differences exist 
between enlisted and officer sample. The next chapter will present the results of each 
model as well as examine the impacts of each variable.  
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IV. RESULTS  
This chapter presents the multivariate results based on the Cox proportional 
hazard model. Section A presents and discusses baseline demographic information for the 
sample of Marines prior to their participation in either a HA/DR operation or an OIF/OEF 
deployment. Such comparison can reveal whether there is systematic differences between 
Marines deployed to different types of mission. Section B presents the four multivariate 
models, one each for depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, substance abuse and self-
inflicted injuries. Section C identifies some limitations in the models and discusses 
additional sensitivity analysis, and Section D will provide a summary of the chapter. 
A. MARINE INFORMATION PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT 
In an effort to better understand the sample of Marines that participate in either 
HA/DR operations or a deployment in support of OIF/OEF, I compare the demographic 
and service information during the years prior to each Marine’s deployment. This 
information is presented in Tables 4 and 5. The samples were significantly different in 
size, with the HA/DR sample consisting of 97,221 person-year observations while the 
OIF/OEF sample had 619,830 observations. 
Generally, the sample of Marines who will have participated in a HA/DR 
operation are similar to those who will deploy in support of OIF/OEF. Both samples are 
predominately male (HA/DR: 96.85%, OIF/OEF: 95.39%) and white (HA/DR: 73.09%, 
OIF/OEF: 72.90%). Marital status, though different by 10%, still shows the majority of 
Marines as single, with a higher percentage of single Marines deploying in support of 
OIF/OEF than a HA/DR operation (HA/DR: 53.73%, OIF/OEF: 64.47%).  
The biggest difference demographic between the two samples of Marines was in 
age. Marines deployed to OEF/OIF tend to be younger compared to those deployed to 
HA/DR missions. More than half of those deployed in support of OIF/OEF were 22 years 
old or younger, while fewer than 40% were in this age category for HA/DR operations. 
 
 32
Table 4.   Demographic information for Marines prior to deployment 
 
 
Whereas the demographic information for the two samples of Marines prior to 
HA/DR operations and OIF/OEF deployments are generally similar, the samples have 
some distinctly different background service variables. For example, HA/DR operations 
have a higher percentage of Marines with aviation military occupational specialties 
(HA/DR: 27.25%, OIF/OEF: 19.24%). Because of the distributed nature of HA/DR 
operations, as well as expected damage to road infrastructure following a disaster, Marine 
aviation is often used to meet the HA/DR commander’s needs. The larger share of 
aviation assets is also reflected in the difference of officer presence since Marine aviators 
are solely officers (HA/DR: 14.51%, OIF/OEF: 9.23%). All other service variables are 






























Table 5.   Service information for Marines prior to deployment 
 
 
B. COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARD MODELS 
This section will present the results of the Cox proportional hazard models used to 
conduct the analysis. First, I will present the effects of both HA/DR and OIF/OEF 
deployments on mental health outcomes. Next, I will discuss other significant risk factors 
of mental health outcomes identified in the results of the models. These risk factors 
include a collection of demographic and service variables that had significantly higher or 
lower hazard ratios than the reference groups. Finally, I will introduce and present the 
HA/DR OIF/ OEF
Percentage Percentage
Combat Arms MOS 30.02% 32.59%
Combat Service Support MOS 40.63% 46.89%
Aviation MOS 27.25% 19.24%
Missing MOS 2.02% 0.00%
Other MOS 1.17% 1.29%





E-6 & Above 15.21% 11.04%





O-6 & Above 0.52% 0.27%







Waiver- None 66.36% 68.84%
Waiver- Minor 1.86% 1.52%
Waiver- Major/Felony 2.29% 2.45%
Waiver- Drug 2.16% 3.76%
Waiver- Other 11.05% 11.14%
97,221 619,830Sample size (n)
Service Information
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results of two additional explanatory models that were produced to further analyze the 
sample.  
1. Effect of Deployments on Mental Health Outcomes 
Table 6 presents the results of the four Cox proportional hazard models, 
specifically the hazard ratios and confidence intervals associated with the four 
deployment variables. The first column of Table 6 shows that HA/DR deployment is 
associated with lower hazard of depression relative to Marines who were never deployed 
to any missions. Specifically, during the year of deployment in support of a humanitarian 
assistance operation, the hazard of depression is 0.417 (CI 0.326, 0.534). In the years 
since the HA/DR operation, the hazard of depression remained low (HR 0.820; CI 0.735, 
0.914). In contrast, while Marines during the year of an OEF/OIF deployment had 
significantly lower hazard of a depression diagnosis (HR 0.601; CI 0.566, 0.637), the risk 
is elevated substantially in the years following a Marine’s return from an OIF/OEF 
deployment (HR 1.617; CI 1.532, 1.706). 
The second column of Table 6 shows that Marines observed during the year of 
their HA/DR deployment have a lower risk of PTSD relative to those who were never 
deployed (HR =0.374; CI 0.306, 0.458). Their risk of PTSD becomes comparable to the 
reference group after they returned from the HA/DR deployment. The most significant 
risk factor for a Marine to develop PTSD is, not surprisingly, previous deployments in 
support of OIF/OEF. During the year of a Marine’s OEF/OIF deployment, they are 
2.98 times more likely (CI 2.835, 3.133) than those with no deployment experience to be 
diagnosed with PTSD. After returning from the deployment, these Marines were 
6.18 times more likely to be diagnosed with PTSD relative to those who were never 
deployed (CI 5.873, 6.509).  
Similar to the previous two outcomes, Table 6 shows that Marines who were 
deployed to a HA/DR mission have a lower hazard of substance abuse relative to those 
who never deployed during the year of their HA/DR deployment (HR 0.508; CI 0.395, 
0.654) and a comparable hazard after they return from the mission. Similarly, Marines 
who participate in an OEF/OIF deployment have a lower hazard of substance abuse 
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during the year of their deployment (HR =0.628; CI 0.586, 0.673), but their risk of 
substance abuse increases after they return from an OIF/OEF deployment (HR 1.972; CI 
1.851, 2.100). 
The final model involving self-inflicted injuries, whose results are presented in 
the final column of Table 6, found that participation in a HA/DR operation both in the 
year observed and in following years had a negative effect on the rates of a Marine 
injuring themselves, with 0.434 (CI 0.256, 0.734) and 0.858 (CI 0.641, 1.140) hazard 
ratios, respectively. Participation in a deployment in support of OIF/OEF in the current 
year observed also had a negative impact on the rate of a self-inflicted injury with a 
hazard ratio of 0.511 (CI 0.447, 0.584) however, in the years following completion of an 
OIF/OEF deployment, a Marine is at a 50% higher risk self-injury (HR 1.501 CI 1.319, 
1.708) relative to Marines who have never deployed. 
Table 6.   Effect of deployments on mental health outcomes 
 
Notes: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Complete survival analysis results are included in 
the Appendix. 
2. Other Significant Risk Factors of Mental Health Outcomes 
Table 9 in the Appendix presents the complete multivariate regression results of 
the four separate Cox proportional hazard models. Outside of the four deployment 
variables, I examined over 40 different demographic and service specific variables and 
their respective hazard ratios to better understand the risk of mental illnesses faced by 
Marines. This section will present selected hazard ratios for some demographic and 
service variables.   
The strongest risk factor identified for a diagnosis of depression is being female 
with a hazard ratio of 2.965 (95% CI 2.81, 3.129), or a 296 percent higher hazard of 
Hazard Ratio 95% CI Hazard Ratio 95% CI Hazard Ratio 95% CI Hazard Ratio 95% CI
During Year of HA/DR Participation 0.417 ** [0.326 , 0.534] 0.374** [0.306 , 0.458] 0.508** [0.395 , 0.654] 0.434** [0.256 , 0.734]
Post HA/DR Participation 0.819** [0.735 , 0.914] 1.024 [0.959 , 1.093] 0.978 [0.87 , 1.1] 0.858 [0.641 , 1.14]
During Year of OIF/OEF Participation 0.601** [0.566 , 0.637] 2.98** [2.835 , 3.133] 0.628** [0.586 , 0.673] 0.511** [0.447 , 0.584]
Post OIF/OEF Participation 1.617** [1.532 , 1.706] 6.183** [5.873 , 6.509] 1.972** [1.851 , 2.1] 1.501** [1.319 , 1.708]
Deployment Information
# Diagnosed = 26,743 # Diagnosed = 9,971 # Diagnosed = 2,763
Depression
# Diagnosed = 11,200
Self Inflicted InjuriesPTSD Substance Abuse
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clinical depression. Having 3 or more children, being divorced, and being married were 
also found to be strongly associated with elevated likelihood of depression with hazard 
ratios of 1.424 (CI 1.306, 1.551), 1.754 (CI 1.599, 1.924), and 1.503 (CI 1.400, 1.615), 
respectively.  
The analysis conducted on the likelihood of a diagnosis of PTSD also found that 
the hazard for a female Marine was significantly higher than the reference male sample, 
with a hazard ratio of 2.317 (CI 2.192, 2.450). The trend of seeing female Marines at a 
higher risk for diagnosis was seen consistently throughout all models and led to the 
development of a follow on interaction model to be discussed later.  
Interestingly, a substance abuse diagnosis was more prevalent in older Marines, 
with higher risks of diagnosis seen in every age group older than the reference, with the 
exception of the oldest category. This increase in hazard was also shown through the 
officer ranks, where Marines are generally older than their enlisted counterparts. Also, 
those Marines who entered service with a felony waiver were at a higher risk for a 
substance abuse diagnosis, with a hazard ratio of 1.333 (CI 1.179, 1.508). 
The most significant demographic risk factor identified for a diagnosis of self-
inflicted injury is a Marine’s marital status. A divorced Marine (HR 2.105 CI 1.688, 
2.624) and a married Marine (HR 1.628 CI 1.402, 1.890) are significantly more likely to 
inflict injury on themselves than a single Marine, which served as the reference. Also, as 
Marines get older, they are less likely to be diagnosed with a self-inflicted injury. The 
hazard rates for diagnosis steadily decrease as the age categories increase. 
These rates are only a snapshot of the entire model, but point to some 
significantly higher or lower risks of diagnosis. The full set of hazard ratios, for all four 
models, can be found in Table 9 of the Appendix.  
3. Additional Exploratory Analysis 
The results provided from the original four Cox proportional hazard models raised 
some additional questions that were examined through further analysis. First, an 
additional interaction model between the female indicator variable and the four different 
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deployment variables was created. This model was constructed to test whether each type 
of deployment, HA/DR or OIF/OEF, affect male and female Marines differently. Further, 
a comparable question was posed between the officer and enlisted populations. 
Therefore, a similar methodology was used where I created a new model interacting the 
officer indicator variable with the four deployment variables. I did not implement the 
interaction models for the self-inflicted injury diagnosis due to an insufficient sample size 
for the year of HA/DR operation variable for both the gender and officer models.  
a. Gender Interaction Model 
The results of the gender interaction model can be found in Table 7. The 
interaction term between the female indicator variable and the post OIF/OEF variable 
produces a hazard ratio of less than 1 for all three mental illnesses evaluated. Since we 
already established hazard ratios of greater than 1 for the same diagnoses without the 
interaction of the female indicator, it can be determined that the post-OIF/OEF effect is 
bigger for male Marines, the reference, than it is for female Marines. In addition, female 
Marines are at a lower hazard for PTSD while deployed in support of OIF/OEF than their 
male counterparts. 
Table 7.   Interaction model between female indicator and  
four deployment variables 
 
Notes: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Complete survival analysis results are included in 
the Appendix. 
Hazard Ratio 95% CI Hazard Ratio 95% CI Hazard Ratio 95% CI
During Year of HA/DR Participation 0.420** [0.326 , 0.542] 0.371** [0.302 , 0.456] 0.488** [0.376 , 0.634]
Post HA/DR Participation 0.838** [0.751 , 0.938] 1.017 [0.952 , 1.087] 0.977 [0.867 , 1.1]
During Year of OIF/OEF Participation 0.609** [0.572 , 0.648] 3.640** [3.447 , 3.846] 0.638** [0.595 , 0.686]
Post OIF/OEF Participation 1.713** [1.619, 1.812] 7.775** [7.351 , 8.224] 2.038** [1.911 , 2.174]
Female X Year of HA/DR 0.872 [0.316 , 2.402] 1.216 [0.446 , 3.314] 2.377+ [0.859 , 6.578]
Female X Post HA/DR Participation 0.584* [0.347 , 0.985] 0.831 [0.556 , 1.243] 0.919 [0.452 , 1.869]
Female X During Year of OIF/OEF 1.003* [0.838 , 1.199] 0.327** [0.281 , 0.382] 0.833 [0.598 , 1.159]
Female X Post OIF/OEF Participation 0.621** [0.539 , 0.717] 0.205** [0.179 , 0.236] 0.549** [0.43 , 0.701]
Depression PTSD Substance Abuse
# Diagnosed = 11,200 # Diagnosed = 17,552 # Diagnosed = 8,041
Deployment Information
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b. Officer Interaction Model 
The results for the officer interaction model can be found in Table 8. Similarly to 
the female interaction model, some significant results can be drawn. The interaction term 
between officer and post OIF/OEF deployment indicators all have low hazard ratios 
suggesting enlisted Marines have higher risks of mental health problems relative to 
Marine officers when both returned from deployments in support of OIF/OEF.  
Table 8.   Interaction model between officer indicator and  
four deployment variables 
 
Notes: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Complete survival analysis results are included in 
the Appendix. 
C. LIMITATIONS 
Although this study used the most complete data available with a proven and 
widely accepted survival analysis methodology, there are several limitations to this study. 
First was the use of a Humanitarian Service Medal as a proxy for participation in a 
Humanitarian Assistance operation. The Marine Corps does not collect Humanitarian 
Assistance/ Disaster Relief deployment information for individual Marines with the same 
effort as it does combat deployments. The only record available that distinguishes a 
Marine as one who participated in a HA/DR operation and one that has not is the 
Humanitarian Service Medal. Although this award represents participation in a HA/DR 
operation it does not represent or distinguish the level or severity of a Marine’s 
participation. As a result, there is no way to distinguish the Marine who was recovering 
dead bodies from a collapsed school with the Marine who was loading a helicopter with 
Hazard Ratio 95% CI Hazard Ratio 95% CI Hazard Ratio 95% CI
During Year of HA/DR Participation 0.417** [0.324 , 0.537] 0.370** [0.301 , 0.455] 0.503** [0.389 , 0.65]
Post HA/DR Participation 0.825** [0.738 , 0.923] 1.030 [0.964 , 1.101] 0.976 [0.866 , 1.1]
During Year of OIF/OEF Participation 0.600** [0.565 , 0.637] 3.011** [2.862 , 3.167] 0.631** [0.589 , 0.677]
Post OIF/OEF Participation 1.634** [1.547 , 1.726] 6.242** [5.925 , 6.575] 2.007** [1.884 , 2.139]
Officer X Year of HA/DR 1.020 [0.318 , 3.268] 1.343 [0.491 , 3.675] 1.543 [0.372 , 6.392]
Officer X Post HA/DR Participation 0.920 [0.586 , 1.443] 0.870 [0.618 , 1.224] 1.175 [0.634 , 2.178]
Officer X During Year of OIF/OEF 1.054 [0.773 , 1.437] 0.633** [0.462 , 0.868] 0.779 [0.473 , 1.282]
Officer X Post OIF/OEF Participation 0.794+ [0.621 , 1.015] 0.682** [0.514 , 0.904] 0.430** [0.286 , 0.648]
Depression PTSD Substance Abuse
Deployment Information
# Diagnosed = 11,200 # Diagnosed = 17,552 # Diagnosed = 8,041
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soccer balls and food hundreds of miles away from the disaster. Without discrediting the 
importance or service of either Marine, one was exposed to a significant trauma while the 
other was not. This type of measurement error is likely to introduce downward bias on 
the estimated results. 
Second, the results might not be generalizable to Marine experience from a 
different time period. For this research, I followed Marines between 2001 and 2011. 
During this period, the United States was conducting significantly more military 
operations than in the three decades prior. With Marines committed in both Operation 
Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, the sample used for analysis was 
subjected to more stress and strain than a sample of Marines from another time period.  
Third, another source of measurement error comes from the aggregated nature of 
the data. The Marines are observed on yearly basis (as opposed to a finer time unit, such 
as monthly). A person who was deployed in an early month of the year is more likely to 
be diagnosed with PTSD, for example, later in the year than a person who was deployed 
in the later part of the year. This measurement error also introduces downward bias in the 
estimation. 
Fourth, the data does not capture any mental health diagnoses of Marines after 
they left active service. A Marine in this sample has the potential to deploy and leave 
service without a mental health diagnosis, only to develop one later in life. This missing 
data will likely bias the estimated hazard ratios towards one, and could possibly be 
mitigated in the future by merging the analytical sample with information from the 
Department of Veterans Affairs. 
Lastly, like any observational study, I do not observe all possible factors that 
might influence a persons’ hazard of being diagnosed with mental health problems (such 
as genetic pre-disposition, other experiences prior to joining the military). 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the results of the multivariate analysis. The general finding 
is that Marines’ hazard of mental health conditions is low relative to those who were not 
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deployed during the time the Marines observed were deployed (either HA/DR or 
OEF/OIF). This is likely due to the fact that their access to health care facility is limited 
during deployments and clinical diagnoses of mental health conditions can only be made 
by licensed health care providers. However, Marines’ experiences diverge between 
HA/DR and OEF/OIF deployments after they return from the theater. Across all four 
outcomes, the results are consistent that those who return from HA/DR missions have no 
elevated risks of mental health conditions relative to those who never deployed. On the 
other hand, those who returned from OEF/OIF missions have substantially higher risks of 
being diagnosed with all four illnesses in the post deployment years. Further analysis also 
revealed that male Marines are more likely to be diagnosed with mental health problems 
relative to female Marines when both returned from deployments to OIF/OEF; likewise, 
enlisted are more likely than officers to be diagnosed with a mental health disorder 
following return from an OIF/OEF deployment. In this chapter, I also examined the 
demographic and service characteristics of the samples of Marines before either a HA/DR 
or combat deployment and identified some differences in the two. These differences in 
samples, coupled with the identified shortfalls of the research, are likely the cause of the 
differences in diagnosis hazard rates between HA/DR deployments and OIF/OEF 
deployments for each of the four mental illnesses. Finally, the chapter discussed several 
limitations in the study that could have introduced biases in the results presented. The 
next chapter will provide some conclusions drawn from these results as well as 




Marines will continue to deploy around the world even after sustained combat 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan come to an end. As America’s expeditionary force in 
readiness, the Marine Corps must be prepared to respond to any mission assigned, 
whether that be a small contingency operation, large-scale combat operations or 
humanitarian assistance operations. As training continues to ensure the Corps is fully 
qualified to meet these needs, extra care must be taken to protect the long term mental 
health of individual Marines. Any degradation in mental health is also a degradation in 
mission readiness. In this thesis, I compare and contrast two types of deployments and 
whether they are associated with elevated risks of mental health problems. In particular, I 
examine deployments that are part of a Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster relief operation 
and deployments that are in support of OEF/OIF. 
A. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE VS. OEF/OIF DEPLOYMENTS 
I found that Marines’ hazard of mental health conditions are low during either 
type of deployments relative to those who were not deployed. While the results might 
seem counterintuitive at first, this is likely due to the fact that Marines’ access to health 
care facilities is limited during deployments, and clinical diagnoses of mental health 
conditions can only be made by licensed health care providers. In addition, Marines are 
simply too busy when conducting these operations to have the self-reflection or 
introspective thoughts often required for the manifestation of these illnesses. Participation 
in an active operation, of any type, is exhaustive and fast paced. Marines taking part in a 
HA/DR operation are typically under some sort of time constraint that affords them only 
an opportunity to focus on the mission and not reflect on the disaster. This theory is 
supported by the fact that this research found the hazard of diagnosis increased for all 
four illnesses in the years following HA/DR participation. The camaraderie and peer 
protection effect during deployment can also contribute to the lower risks during time of 
deployments. 
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However, Marines’ experiences diverge between HA/DR and OEF/OIF 
deployments after they return from the theater. Across all four outcomes, the results are 
consistent that those who return from HA/DR missions have no elevated risks of mental 
health conditions relative to those who never deployed. On the other hand, those who 
returned from OEF/OIF missions have substantially higher risks of being diagnosed with 
all four illnesses in the post-deployment years.  
The differences in the post-deployment experiences between these two types of 
deployment can be due to several possibilities. First, is the differences in the two 
samples. Although both were generally similar in demographic information, 
dissimilarities existed in both size and service information.  
Second, the differences might be due to some of the study limitations discussed in 
Chapter IV. Shortfalls in data, availability of providers capable of diagnosing a mental 
disorder and inability to observe all possible mental health risk factors could all lead to 
the differences identified.   
Third, Marines who are subjected to the horrific destruction associated with a 
HA/DR operation possibly become more grateful for what they have at home and lead a 
mentally healthier lifestyle. This idea, traditionally known as resilience or more recently 
known as post-traumatic growth, suggests that a positive psychological change can occur 
following a difficult, stressful, and potentially traumatic life event (Calhoun & Tedeschi, 
2006). Marines can start relating better with others, look for new healthy opportunities, 
and become more connected spiritually. Research for post-traumatic growth is still in its 
infancy, but some applications can be applied to explain the results of this research.   
Lastly, the diverging results between the two types of deployment could be partly 
due to the different natures of the deployment. Marines deployed to either a HA/DR 
operation or an OIF/OEF operation can be subjected to trauma. However, the nature of 
the trauma and the method by which it is inflicted vary drastically between combat and 
humanitarian assistance. When deployed as a humanitarian, Marines are in place to help 
devastated communities and assist local populations in getting through the traumatic 
event. However, in combat, a Marine is primarily exposed to and may potentially be the 
 43
means behind traumatic events for others—whether intentionally or not. Further 
comparisons between the outcomes of these two types of deployments, with the addition 
of many others, should be considered.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Research into the effects of combat on the mental health of Marines has been 
widely studied over the last 15 years; however, research into the effects different 
deployment types have on the mental health of Marines is extremely limited. As 
sustained combat in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom end, 
research into HA/DR participation should be readdressed. Without the stress of two 
ongoing combat operations on the shoulders of Marines, the effects of HA/DR 
participation could differ. 
Another facet of HA/DR operations not included in this study involves the 
application of medical aid to disaster victims. Because the Marine Corps has no organic 
medical capabilities, this role is filled by Navy Corpsman and doctors. These sailors have 
some of the most extreme exposure to trauma during HA/DR operations, and have the 
potential to form bonds with their patients as their care can take days or weeks. Research 
into the follow-on mental health issues faced by Navy medical personnel following 
HA/DR operations could yield interesting results and help improve mental health 
policies. 
This thesis studied the effects of HA/DR deployments on the mental health 
diagnosis rates of Marines. It was limited in scope to include only Marines and only 
during a 10-year period. Therefore, it is recommended that it be expanded both in size to 
include other military branches and in duration to include periods of time when two large 
scale combat operations are not underway. 
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Table 9.   Effect of deployments on mental health outcomes, full results 
 
Notes: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
Hazard Ratio 95% CI Hazard Ratio 95% CI Hazard Ratio 95% CI Hazard Ratio 95% CI
During Year of HA/DR Participation 0.417 ** [0.326 , 0.534] 0.374** [0.306 , 0.458] 0.508** [0.395 , 0.654] 0.434** [0.256 , 0.734]
Post HA/DR Participation 0.819** [0.735 , 0.914] 1.024 [0.959 , 1.093] 0.978 [0.87 , 1.1] 0.858 [0.641 , 1.14]
During Year of OIF/OEF Participation 0.601** [0.566 , 0.637] 2.98** [2.835 , 3.133] 0.628** [0.586 , 0.673] 0.511** [0.447 , 0.584]
Post OIF/OEF Participation 1.617** [1.532 , 1.706] 6.183** [5.873 , 6.509] 1.972** [1.851 , 2.1] 1.501** [1.319 , 1.708]
White 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
Black 0.808** [0.758 , 0.86] 0.778** [0.738 , 0.82] 0.742** [0.684 , 0.805] 0.961 [0.844 , 1.094]
Hispanic 0.718** [0.669 , 0.77] 0.752** [0.714 , 0.792] 0.732** [0.675 , 0.794] 0.873* [0.763 , 0.999]
Asian 0.737** [0.652 , 0.832] 0.704** [0.636 , 0.78] 0.668** [0.575 , 0.775] 0.809+ [0.639 , 1.02]
Other Race 0.868** [0.797 , 0.945] 0.939+ [0.878 , 1.004] 1.138* [1.03 , 1.258] 1.152 [0.95 , 1.397]
Male 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
Female 2.965** [2.81 , 3.129] 2.317** [2.192 , 2.45] 1.117* [1.021 , 1.222] 2.500** [2.242 , 2.78]
Age Category
<22 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
22-24 1.079** [1.021 , 1.14] 1.233** [1.176 , 1.292] 1.896** [1.781 , 2.019] 0.925 [0.835 , 1.024]
25-29 1.137** [1.064 , 1.215] 1.147** [1.084 , 1.213] 2.063** [1.911 , 2.228] 0.783** [0.678 , 0.905]
30-34 1.128* [1.024 , 1.242] 1.145** [1.059 , 1.237] 1.940** [1.714 , 2.195] 0.626** [0.472 , 0.83]
35-39 1.089 [0.966 , 1.228] 1.229** [1.117 , 1.352] 1.735** [1.465 , 2.056] 0.544** [0.357 , 0.829]
>40 0.715** [0.644 , 0.794] 0.996 [0.904 , 1.097] 0.559** [0.481 , 0.648] 0.369** [0.311 , 0.439]
Single 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
Married 1.503** [1.4 , 1.615] 1.405** [1.322 , 1.493] 1.290 [1.18 , 1.411] 1.628** [1.402 , 1.89]
Post Divorce 1.754** [1.599 , 1.924] 1.589** [1.475 , 1.711] 1.596 [1.423 , 1.79] 2.105** [1.688 , 2.624]
Number of Dependents
0 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
1 1.161** [1.08 , 1.249] 1.157** [1.088 , 1.23] 0.867** [0.79 , 0.95] 0.898 [0.767 , 1.05]
2 1.274** [1.174 , 1.383] 1.221** [1.142 , 1.306] 0.897* [0.809 , 0.995] 0.824* [0.68 , 0.998]
3+ 1.424** [1.306 , 1.551] 1.407** [1.313 , 1.509] 0.967+ [0.866 , 1.079] 1.065 [0.859 , 1.318]
Combat Arms MOS 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
Combat Service Support MOS 1.022 [0.976 , 1.071] 0.671** [0.649 , 0.694] 0.929** [0.882 , 0.978] 0.879** [0.798 , 0.968]
Aviation MOS 0.922** [0.87 , 0.978] 0.357** [0.337 , 0.379] 0.835** [0.779 , 0.894] 0.806** [0.71 , 0.916]
Missing MOS 1.036 [0.937 , 1.147] 0.76** [0.676 , 0.854] 0.718** [0.628 , 0.821] 2.407** [2.095 , 2.764]
Other MOS 2.071** [1.841 , 2.33] 0.989 [0.872 , 1.12] 1.190+ [0.996 , 1.422] 3.433** [2.875 , 4.099]
Enlisted (Total) 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
E-3 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
E-1/E-2 0.176** [0.165 , 0.188] 0.228** [0.212 , 0.245] 0.256** [0.238 , 0.275] 0.372** [0.336 , 0.413]
E-4 0.669** [0.632 , 0.708] 0.776** [0.743 , 0.811] 0.491** [0.461 , 0.523] 0.465** [0.41 , 0.527]
E-5 0.507** [0.473 , 0.543] 0.604** [0.573 , 0.636] 0.299** [0.276 , 0.324] 0.264** [0.222 , 0.314]
E-6 & Above 0.385** [0.351 , 0.423] 0.397** [0.369 , 0.428] 0.200** [0.177 , 0.226] 0.162** [0.122 , 0.217]
Officer (Total) 0.232** [0.192 , 0.281] 0.165** [0.14 , 0.195] 0.066** [0.047 , 0.092] 0.027** [0.007 , 0.112]
O-3 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
O-1/O-2 0.613** [0.463 , 0.813] 0.684+ [0.513 , 0.912] 1.252 [0.816 , 1.921] 3.198 [0.673 , 15.18]
O-4 0.813 [0.617 , 1.071] 0.792+ [0.624 , 1.004] 1.533+ [0.976 , 2.406] 6.155* [1.268 , 29.89]
O-5 0.874 [0.633 , 1.206] 0.655** [0.486 , 0.884] 1.783* [1.004 , 3.165] 3.320 [0.463 , 23.82]
O-6 & Above 0.769 [0.485 , 1.219] 0.627* [0.412 , 0.954] 1.711 [0.668 , 4.381] - -
Warrant Officer 0.333** [0.26 , 0.428] 0.38** [0.318 , 0.455] 0.126** [0.079 , 0.2] 0.206** [0.083 , 0.514]
AFQT Category
<30 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
31-49 1.163** [1.056 , 1.28] 1.13** [1.045 , 1.221] 1.098 [0.965 , 1.249] 1.909** [1.43 , 2.54]
50-64 1.077 [0.978 , 1.186] 0.984 [0.91 , 1.065] 1.052 [0.924 , 1.198] 1.894** [1.419 , 2.528]
65-92 1.015 [0.924 , 1.116] 0.776** [0.718 , 0.839] 0.904 [0.795 , 1.028] 1.899** [1.426 , 2.527]
>93 0.883+ [0.776 , 1.005] 0.534** [0.474 , 0.601] 0.638** [0.538 , 0.757] 1.525* [1.089 , 2.134]
Waiver- None 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
Waiver- Minor 1.004 [0.848 , 1.19] 1.126+ [0.995 , 1.276] 0.916 [0.739 , 1.135] 0.769 [0.482 , 1.227]
Waiver- Major/Felony 1.063 [0.942 , 1.199] 1.078 [0.984 , 1.18] 1.333** [1.179 , 1.508] 0.789 [0.589 , 1.05]
Waiver- Drug 0.801** [0.718 , 0.893] 0.91* [0.841 , 0.984] 0.944 [0.848 , 1.051] 0.930 [0.772 , 1.119]
Waiver- Other 1.073* [1.014 , 1.136] 1.094 [1.045 , 1.145] 1.041 [0.972 , 1.116] 1.025 [0.907 , 1.15]
2,685,661
Service Information
Number of Observations (N)
Demographic Information
Deployment Information
# Diagnosed = 26,743 # Diagnosed = 9,971 # Diagnosed = 2,763
Depression
# Diagnosed = 11,200
Self Inflicted InjuriesPTSD Substance Abuse
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Table 10.   Interaction model between female indicator and four deployment variables 
 
Notes: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
Hazard Ratio 95% CI Hazard Ratio 95% CI Hazard Ratio 95% CI
During Year of HA/DR Participation 0.420** [0.326 , 0.542] 0.371** [0.302 , 0.456] 0.488** [0.376 , 0.634]
Post HA/DR Participation 0.838** [0.751 , 0.938] 1.017 [0.952 , 1.087] 0.977 [0.867 , 1.1]
During Year of OIF/OEF Participation 0.609** [0.572 , 0.648] 3.640** [3.447 , 3.846] 0.638** [0.595 , 0.686]
Post OIF/OEF Participation 1.713** [1.619, 1.812] 7.775** [7.351 , 8.224] 2.038** [1.911 , 2.174]
Female X Year of HA/DR 0.872 [0.316 , 2.402] 1.216 [0.446 , 3.314] 2.377+ [0.859 , 6.578]
Female X Post HA/DR Participation 0.584* [0.347 , 0.985] 0.831 [0.556 , 1.243] 0.919 [0.452 , 1.869]
Female X During Year of OIF/OEF 1.003* [0.838 , 1.199] 0.327** [0.281 , 0.382] 0.833 [0.598 , 1.159]
Female X Post OIF/OEF Participation 0.621** [0.539 , 0.717] 0.205** [0.179 , 0.236] 0.549** [0.43 , 0.701]
White 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
Black 0.808** [0.76 , 0.861] 0.779** [0.739 , 0.821] 0.742** [0.684 , 0.805]
Hispanic 0.719** [0.671 , 0.772] 0.756** [0.719 , 0.797] 0.734** [0.676 , 0.795]
Asian 0.738** [0.653 , 0.834] 0.708** [0.64 , 0.784] 0.669** [0.576 , 0.776]
Other Race 0.872** [0.801 , 0.95] 0.953 [0.892 , 1.019] 1.142** [1.033 , 1.263]
Male 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
Female 3.244** [3.05 , 3.449] 4.769** [4.43 , 5.135] 1.266** [1.143 , 1.402]
Age Category
<22 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
22-24 1.079** [1.022 , 1.141] 1.225** [1.169 , 1.284] 1.895** [1.78 , 2.017]
25-29 1.137** [1.064 , 1.216] 1.138** [1.077 , 1.205] 2.062** [1.909 , 2.226]
30-34 1.125* [1.022 , 1.24] 1.130** [1.046 , 1.222] 1.936** [1.711 , 2.19]
35-39 1.085 [0.962 , 1.223] 1.208** [1.098 , 1.329] 1.729** [1.459 , 2.049]
>40 0.711** [0.64 , 0.79] 0.972 [0.883 , 1.072] 0.557** [0.48 , 0.646]
Single 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
Married 1.504** [1.401 , 1.615] 1.415** [1.332 , 1.505] 1.293** [1.182 , 1.414]
Post Divorce 1.778** [1.621 , 1.952] 1.645** [1.528 , 1.772] 1.615** [1.44 , 1.811]
Number of Dependents
0 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
1 1.158** [1.078 , 1.246] 1.136** [1.071 , 1.211] 0.864** [0.788 , 0.947]
2 1.265** [1.166 , 1.374] 1.191** [1.113 , 1.274] 0.892* [0.804 , 0.989]
3+ 1.402** [1.286 , 1.528] 1.354** [1.263 , 1.452] 0.956 [0.856 , 1.067]
Combat Arms MOS 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
Combat Service Support MOS 1.026 [0.98 , 1.076] 0.680** [0.658 , 0.704] 0.931** [0.885 , 0.98]
Aviation MOS 0.926* [0.873 , 0.983] 0.363** [0.343 , 0.385] 0.837** [0.782 , 0.897]
Missing MOS 1.042 [0.941 , 1.153] 0.763** [0.679 , 0.859] 0.721** [0.63 , 0.824]
Other MOS 2.090** [1.858 , 2.352] 1.018 [0.898 , 1.154] 1.197* [1.001 , 1.43]
Enlisted (Total) 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
E-3 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
E-1/E-2 0.176** [0.165 , 0.188] 0.237** [0.22 , 0.255] 0.257** [0.239 , 0.276]
E-4 0.668** [0.632 , 0.708] 0.778** [0.745 , 0.813] 0.491** [0.461 , 0.524]
E-5 0.508** [0.475 , 0.544] 0.609** [0.579 , 0.642] 0.300** [0.277 , 0.325]
E-6 & Above 0.387** [0.353 , 0.425] 0.404** [0.375 , 0.435] 0.201** [0.178 , 0.227]
Officer (Total) 0.236** [0.195 , 0.286] 0.171** [0.145 , 0.202] 0.067** [0.048 , 0.093]
O-3 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
O-1/O-2 0.602** [0.455 , 0.799] 0.667** [0.5 , 0.89] 1.252 [0.816 , 1.921]
O-4 0.806 [0.612 , 1.063] 0.781* [0.616 , 0.991] 1.524+ [0.971 , 2.392]
O-5 0.862 [0.625 , 1.189] 0.643** [0.477 , 0.869] 1.763+ [0.993 , 3.129]
O-6 & Above 0.755 [0.476 , 1.197] 0.608* [0.4 , 0.926] 1.688 [0.659 , 4.324]
Warrant Officer 0.335** [0.262 , 0.431] 0.389** [0.325 , 0.466] 0.127 [0.079 , 0.201]
AFQT Category
<30 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
31-49 1.159** [1.053 , 1.277] 1.119** [1.035 , 1.209] 1.097 [0.964 , 1.248]
50-64 1.076 [0.977 , 1.184] 0.977 [0.904 , 1.058] 1.052 [0.924 , 1.198]
65-92 1.014 [0.923 , 1.114] 0.771** [0.713 , 0.833] 0.903 [0.795 , 1.027]
>93 0.882+ [0.776 , 1.004] 0.532** [0.472 , 0.599] 0.639** [0.539 , 0.757]
Waiver- None 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
Waiver- Minor 1.003 [0.847 , 1.188] 1.125+ [0.994 , 1.275] 0.916 [0.739 , 1.135]
Waiver- Major/Felony 1.063 [0.942 , 1.199] 1.077 [0.984 , 1.179] 1.333** [1.179 , 1.508]
Waiver- Drug 0.801** [0.719 , 0.893] 0.909* [0.841 , 0.984] 0.944 [0.848 , 1.051]
Waiver- Other 1.073* [1.014 , 1.137] 1.097 [1.048 , 1.148] 1.042 [0.972 , 1.117]
Depression PTSD Substance Abuse
Service Information
Number of Observations (N)





Table 11.   Interaction model between officer indicator and four deployment variables 
 
Notes: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
Hazard Ratio 95% CI Hazard Ratio 95% CI Hazard Ratio 95% CI
During Year of HA/DR Participation 0.417** [0.324 , 0.537] 0.370** [0.301 , 0.455] 0.503** [0.389 , 0.65]
Post HA/DR Participation 0.825** [0.738 , 0.923] 1.030 [0.964 , 1.101] 0.976 [0.866 , 1.1]
During Year of OIF/OEF Participation 0.600** [0.565 , 0.637] 3.011** [2.862 , 3.167] 0.631** [0.589 , 0.677]
Post OIF/OEF Participation 1.634** [1.547 , 1.726] 6.242** [5.925 , 6.575] 2.007** [1.884 , 2.139]
Officer X Year of HA/DR 1.020 [0.318 , 3.268] 1.343 [0.491 , 3.675] 1.543 [0.372 , 6.392]
Officer X Post HA/DR Participation 0.920 [0.586 , 1.443] 0.870 [0.618 , 1.224] 1.175 [0.634 , 2.178]
Officer X During Year of OIF/OEF 1.054 [0.773 , 1.437] 0.633** [0.462 , 0.868] 0.779 [0.473 , 1.282]
Officer X Post OIF/OEF Participation 0.794+ [0.621 , 1.015] 0.682** [0.514 , 0.904] 0.430** [0.286 , 0.648]
White 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
Black 0.808** [0.759 , 0.861] 0.778** [0.738 , 0.82] 0.742** [0.684 , 0.805]
Hispanic 0.718** [0.669 , 0.769] 0.752** [0.714 , 0.792] 0.732** [0.675 , 0.794]
Asian 0.737** [0.652 , 0.833] 0.704** [0.636 , 0.78] 0.668** [0.576 , 0.776]
Other Race 0.868** [0.798 , 0.946] 0.939+ [0.878 , 1.004] 1.139* [1.03 , 1.259]
Male 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
Female 2.967** [2.812 , 3.131] 2.319** [2.193 , 2.452] 1.118* [1.023 , 1.223]
Age Category
<22 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
22-24 1.077** [1.019 , 1.138] 1.231** [1.174 , 1.29] 1.888** [1.773 , 2.01]
25-29 1.135** [1.062 , 1.213] 1.146** [1.084 , 1.213] 2.057** [1.905 , 2.221]
30-34 1.128* [1.024 , 1.242] 1.146** [1.06 , 1.239] 1.942** [1.716 , 2.197]
35-39 1.091 [0.968 , 1.23] 1.232** [1.12 , 1.355] 1.748** [1.475 , 2.071]
>40 0.717** [0.645 , 0.796] 0.999 [0.907 , 1.1] 0.562** [0.484 , 0.652]
Single 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
Married 1.503** [1.4 , 1.614] 1.405** [1.322 , 1.493] 1.291** [1.18 , 1.411]
Post Divorce 1.754** [1.598 , 1.924] 1.589** [1.476 , 1.711] 1.596** [1.424 , 1.79]
Number of Dependents
0 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
1 1.161** [1.08 , 1.249] 1.157** [1.088 , 1.229] 0.866** [0.79 , 0.95]
2 1.275** [1.174 , 1.383] 1.222** [1.142 , 1.307] 0.898* [0.809 , 0.996]
3+ 1.424** [1.307 , 1.552] 1.408** [1.313 , 1.509] 0.968 [0.867 , 1.08]
Combat Arms MOS 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
Combat Service Support MOS 1.023 [0.976 , 1.072] 0.672** [0.65 , 0.695] 0.930** [0.883 , 0.979]
Aviation MOS 0.923** [0.87 , 0.979] 0.358** [0.338 , 0.379] 0.835** [0.779 , 0.894]
Missing MOS 1.037 [0.937 , 1.147] 0.760** [0.676 , 0.854] 0.719** [0.628 , 0.822]
Other MOS 2.068** [1.838 , 2.326] 0.986 [0.87 , 1.117] 1.185+ [0.992 , 1.416]
Enlisted (Total) 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
E-3 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
E-1/E-2 0.176** [0.165 , 0.188] 0.229** [0.213 , 0.247] 0.256** [0.238 , 0.276]
E-4 0.667** [0.63 , 0.706] 0.775** [0.741 , 0.809] 0.489** [0.458 , 0.521]
E-5 0.504** [0.471 , 0.54] 0.602** [0.571 , 0.634] 0.296** [0.273 , 0.321]
E-6 & Above 0.383** [0.349 , 0.42] 0.395** [0.367 , 0.425] 0.197** [0.174 , 0.223]
Officer (Total) 0.262** [0.205 , 0.334] 0.240** [0.179 , 0.323] 0.110** [0.072 , 0.166]
O-3 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
O-1/O-2 0.556** [0.412 , 0.751] 0.598** [0.439 , 0.816] 0.858 [0.539 , 1.367]
O-4 0.816 [0.619 , 1.076] 0.790+ [0.622 , 1.001] 1.563+ [0.995 , 2.454]
O-5 0.853 [0.617 , 1.179] 0.632** [0.468 , 0.854] 1.609 [0.903 , 2.866]
O-6 & Above 0.755 [0.476 , 1.198] 0.617* [0.405 , 0.939] 1.663 [0.649 , 4.263]
Warrant Officer 0.331** [0.258 , 0.425] 0.378** [0.316 , 0.453] 0.124** [0.078 , 0.198]
AFQT Category
<30 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
31-49 1.164** [1.057 , 1.282] 1.131** [1.046 , 1.223] 1.106 [0.971 , 1.26]
50-64 1.079 [0.98 , 1.189] 0.986 [0.911 , 1.067] 1.061 [0.931 , 1.21]
65-92 1.018 [0.926 , 1.119] 0.778** [0.719 , 0.841] 0.913 [0.802 , 1.039]
>93 0.886+ [0.778 , 1.008] 0.535** [0.475 , 0.602] 0.645** [0.544 , 0.766]
Waiver- None 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000] 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
Waiver- Minor 1.005 [0.848 , 1.191] 1.127+ [0.995 , 1.276] 0.917 [0.739 , 1.136]
Waiver- Major/Felony 1.063 [0.943 , 1.199] 1.078 [0.984 , 1.18] 1.333** [1.179 , 1.508]
Waiver- Drug 0.801** [0.718 , 0.893] 0.909* [0.841 , 0.983] 0.944 [0.847 , 1.051]
Waiver- Other 1.073* [1.014 , 1.136] 1.094** [1.045 , 1.145] 1.042 [0.972 , 1.116]
Depression PTSD Substance Abuse
2,685,661
Demographic Information
Number of Observations (N)
Deployment Information
Service Information
# Diagnosed = 11,200 # Diagnosed = 17,552 # Diagnosed = 8,041
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